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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to show that the ‘great recession’ of 2007 in the USA is of 
the classical type with basic features the rising value composition of capital which 
more than fully offset the rising rate of surplus value giving rise to a falling rate of 
profit. The tendential fall of the latter, from a point onwards, led to a stagnant mass of 
real net profits, thereby decreased net investment and eventually impacted on 
employment. The evolution of capital intensity and the consequences of unproductive 
activities remain key issues in the discussions of capital accumulation and its periodic 
ruptures. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to review some crucial relations among the key variables that 
relate to the rate of profit, the principle macroeconomic variable that shapes the process of 
capital accumulation, and its rupture through periodic crises. The testing ground for these 
variables will be the US economy for it continues to shape, to a great extent, the stage of the 
world economy. The main thesis of this article is that in the postwar USA there have been two 
successive phase-changes in the long-wave-like evolution of its economy. The first, starting 
with a period of expansion lasting up until the mid to late-1960s and it has been characterized 
as the ‘golden age of accumulation’ and was followed by the ‘stagflation crisis’ of the late-
1960s (known also as the ‘silent depression’) that ended in the early to mid-1980s (Tsoulfidis, 
2002). The rising phase of the second postwar long wave known as the ‘new golden age of 
accumulation’ or ‘neoliberal period’ reaches its tipping point around the middle to the end of 
the first decade of the new millennium. The current situation is characterized by a 
continuation of the recessionary phase although the US economy seems to have recovered 
somewhat since 2007; however, the general sense is that this is far from a vigorous recovery. 
The phenomena observed in the identification of the two tipping points (by the late-1960s and 
the late-2000s) are quite similar and these are the falling rate of profit and the associated with 
it stagnating mass of real net profits. The latter slows down new investment spending; thereby 
leading to the devaluation of capital and to quite severe unemployment especially when the 
discouraged workers are counted in the official statistics as well as the rising number of the 
long-run unemployed population while part-time employment by no means should be equated 
to full-time employment. The fall in the rate of profit is consistent with the hypothesis of a 
rising rate of surplus value and a simultaneously increasing value composition of capital; the 
latter reflecting changes in the technical composition of capital, concepts explicated in the 
next section. Furthermore, the fall in the rate of profit affecting, and being affected by, the 
expansion of unproductive expenditures encapsulates interesting new developments in the 
area of technical change. 
It is important to note that this description of the US postwar economy has been 
challenged by Zarembka (2015), who takes issue with the idea of the rising material 
composition of capital (or capital-output ratio) which he finds to be more or less trendless for 
the 1956-20011 period and so argues that the evolution of the rate of profit has been shaped 
mainly by distributional factors, in particular by the rate of surplus value which is also behind 
the rising value composition of capital. Mohun (2014), on the other hand, challenges the 
claim that the rising non-production labour and expenditures contributed to the precipitation 
in the fall of the net rate of profit. Clearly, these are important issues that must be fully 
addressed in the face of updated and newly released more detailed data (see Appendix 1) 
which allow for longer time span estimations and also for the more refined construction of the 
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above key variables. As a consequence, the present article responds to the issues raised by the 
above two authors and by doing so sheds additional light to the current predicament. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes in a growth 
accounting framework the relationship between the value composition of capital, the 
evolution of the material composition of capital and the rate of surplus value as well as the 
effects of prices and demand. Section 3, argues that the fall in the rate of profit affects and is 
being affected by the unproductive expenditures which weaken the growth potential of the 
economy leading to the present prolonged recessionary situation. Section 4 summarizes and 
makes some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The compositions of capital and the rate of surplus value  
The various compositions of capital became the focus of analysis of many radical authors 
during the decades of 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Rosdolsky, 1977 and  Shaikh, 1987 and the 
literature cited there). Starting with the technical composition of capital (TCC) the “inner 
measure of the composition” of capital refers to the vector of capital goods per worker and it 
is transformed to a scalar when multiplied by the vector of labour values at the base year 
giving rise to an index called technical composition (TC) which by virtue of technological 
progress tends to rise secularly. The increase in TC will also tend to increase also the value 
composition of capital (VCC) defined as  
𝐶𝐶
𝑣𝑣
= �𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑣𝑣0
� �
𝜆𝜆1
𝜆𝜆2
� �
1
𝑤𝑤
� 
where  𝐶𝐶 is the (gross) capital stock, 𝑣𝑣 the variable capital, 𝑣𝑣0 the unit of labour power at the 
base year, 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 the unit values of capital and consumer goods, respectively and finally 𝑤𝑤 
is the real wage.  The materialized composition of capital (MCC) is defined as  
𝐶𝐶
𝑙𝑙
= �𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑣𝑣0
� (𝜆𝜆1) �𝑣𝑣0ℎ � 
with ℎ the length of the working day and l the value of living labour or the value added.1  
Clearly, both the VCC and MCC depend on the TC but also on the relative unit values, 
along with the distributional factors. However, the crucial determinant turns out to be the TC 
since the relative unit values are expected to be very close to each other. The idea is that the 
rising TCC induces changes in the unit values of the means of production and the means of 
consumption, because the two unit values refer to general categories of commodities, which 
on the one hand may overlap while on the other hand, it is in the nature of technological 
change not to be confined to any single industry or department of production, but to rather 
                                                          
1 For the sake of simplicity, we eliminated the time symbol 𝑡𝑡 from the above variables. 
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rapidly diffused across industries.2 In other words, the totality of industries in the economy 
are aggregated into two major departments, and therefore the ratio of their unit values is not 
expected to be quite different and should display fluctuating behaviour around and not far 
from one.3 The rising real wage may cause the VCC to lag more or less behind the organic 
composition of capital (OCC) defined as  
𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑣𝑣0
 
Thus, the OCC will form an upper bound in the evolution of the VCC while the MCC will 
form the lower bound of the VCC. The connecting link between the VCC and the MCC is the 
rate of surplus value. Thus we may write, 
𝐶𝐶
𝑣𝑣
= 𝐶𝐶
𝑙𝑙
𝑙𝑙
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𝑙𝑙
(1 + 𝑒𝑒) 
If the MCC or the capital-output ratio is rising, then the VCC is also rising and if the rate of 
surplus value is rising then the VCC is rising even more. Thus, if this is true, then it follows 
that a rising C/v, reflects the changes in the MCC, that is, the ratio C/l and in general we will 
have 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
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𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀≈𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 if 𝜆𝜆1/𝜆𝜆2≈1 ≤
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑣𝑣0�
𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
≤ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 
The availability of data allows us to take a long enough time period of 51 years starting 
from 1964, a year near the end of a rising phase known as the “golden age of accumulation” 
and including the ‘stagflation crisis’ of the 1970s and early to mid-1980s followed by the  
period of neoliberalism of steady growth, known as the ‘new economy’ which was interrupted 
by the end of year 2007, the starting year of what has been characterized by orthodox and 
heterodox economists alike the onset of the ‘great recession’ whose impact extends up to the 
year 2015, the last year that we managed to collate reliable data. It is important to point out 
that in the estimation of the MCC, we used data gross capital stock data which we constructed 
for the total US economy. The rationale for the utilization of gross (instead of the available 
net) capital stock data as well as the estimating method is discussed in Appendix 2.  
 
                                                          
2 “If it is further assumed that this gradual change in the composition of capital is not confined only to 
individual spheres of production, but it occurs more or less in all, or at least in the key spheres of 
production, so that it involves changes in the average organic composition of the total capital of a 
certain society, then the gradual growth of constant capital in relation to variable must necessarily lead 
to a gradual fall of the general rate of profit [...]” (Marx, 1894, pp. 212). 
3 The theoretical expectation but also the empirical findings on price-value deviations suggest that the 
more aggregated the input-output tables, the closer the labour values to market prices. This is an 
empirical regularity ascertained in a number of studies (Tsoulfidis, 2010, and the literature cited there).  
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Figure 1. Materialized Composition of Capital, USA, 1964-2015  
 
The average annual growth rate of the VCC during the period 1964-2015 is 1.79%, whereas 
for the same time period the growth rate of the rate of surplus value is at 1.07% and these 
estimates result in an overall falling rate of profit.4 Meanwhile, the MCC grows mildly over 
the years at an average annual rate of 0.95%. In Figure 1, we observe that after 1999 and up 
until the year 2011 the growth rate of the MCC accelerates and reaches 1.78% and becomes 
negative thereafter. Zarembka’s (2015) presents estimates of the MCC for meaningfully 
selected years and furthermore, he adjusts them by the degree of capacity utilization. 
Zarembka's data on the MCC display (especially after 1956) a pretty much trendless path 
leading to the idea that the rising VCC may be attributed to the rising rate of surplus value 
and not necessarily to the MCC. Such a conclusion necessitates the breaking down of the total 
growth in the VCC to its constituent components. The results of the growth accounting 
exercise conducted (see Tsoulfidis, 2015) on the basis of net capital stock showed that both 
the distributional and the technical factors are major determinants of the evolution of the 
VCC, but also that between the two, the technical factor, that is, the capital-output ratio in 
constant prices, was somewhat more influential. We repeat the same exercise using a longer 
time span and data that we constructed for the gross capital stock of the total economy and 
also adjust it by the degree of capacity utilization.5 
                                                          
4 See the appendix for the estimation of the surplus value and variable capital.  
5 For the estimation of the gross capital stock of the total economy, we use the method employed by 
Shaikh (2016, Appendix 6.5) for the US corporate sector. The data on capacity utilization is for the 
total industrial sector and are reported in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis http://research. 
stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TCU. Hence, we are assuming that full capacity utilization is 82 percent, the 
usually assumed benchmark rate beyond which there are exercised inflationary pressures on the 
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Hence, we have an old empirical issue, the evolution of the capital-output ratio, which in 
the classical tradition is expected to be rising, because technological progress tends to be 
capital-using and labour-saving. Our data show that the capital-output ratio displays long 
fluctuations around a rising trend. From the early-1980s and the full decade of the 1990s, the 
capital-output ratio is nearly constant indicating that the growth in output is approximately 
equal to the growth of capital stock and from the late-1990s onwards, the capital-output 
display a rising trend up until the year 2011. To what extent, if any, the rising trend in the 
capital-output ratio (or MCC) is responsible for the rising value composition of capital and 
the falling tendency in the rate of profit is a question that can be dealt with by breaking down 
the growth rate of the value composition of capital to its four constituent components or 
factors; namely, the distributional, price, technical and finally the demand effects.  
 The breakdown of the VCC evaluated in market prices (not in values) can be shown 
starting with the definition of the value composition of capital 
𝐶𝐶
𝑣𝑣
= �𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦
𝐾𝐾 ∙ 𝑢𝑢
𝑦𝑦
�
�����
MCC
�
𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
𝑣𝑣
����
1+𝑒𝑒
 
where 𝐶𝐶 is the value or the fixed gross capital stock in current prices; 𝑣𝑣 stands for the variable 
capital; 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  and 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 are the price indices of capital stock and value-added respectively; 𝐾𝐾 and 𝑦𝑦 
are the capital and value-added, both evaluated in constant prices; finally, 𝑢𝑢 is the rate of 
capacity utilization. The bracketed term in the above equation includes the components of the 
MCC whereas the term in the parenthesis is the ratio of value added to the variable capital or 
the term 1 + 𝑒𝑒. By taking growth rates in the above equation, we can attribute the growth rate 
of the VCC into its constituent components and assess their relative contribution to the overall 
growth of the VCC. Thus, we may write  
�
𝐶𝐶
𝑣𝑣
�
� = �𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦
�
�
���
Price Effect + 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦
�
⏟
Technology
Effect
+ 𝑢𝑢�⏟
Demand 
Effect
+ �𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
𝑣𝑣
�
�
���
Distribution Effect
  
where a hat over a variable or a term indicates its annual average growth rate.6  
The growth of the VCC therefore reflects not only the changes in the material features of 
the process of production, but also the induced changes in the structure of prices (relative 
prices) and income distribution as well as the strength of demand relative to supply as 
captured by the degree of capacity utilization. The effect of each and every one of these terms 
for selected time periods is given in Table 1 below.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
economy (Mattey, 1996). Finally, we used data on investment and value added deflators of the base 
year 2009 from the Fed of St. Louis https://fred.stlouisfed.org/help-faq. 
6 For the estimating methods and data sources see the Appendix 1 
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Table 1. Growth accounting of the value composition of capital, annual rates 
       Growth 
       Rates 
 
Periods 
Value 
Composition of 
Capital 
(1)=(2)+(3)+(4)+(5) 
Relative 
Price Factor 
Effect 
(2) 
Technical 
Change 
Factor 
Effect 
(3) 
Demand 
Factor 
Effect 
(4) 
Distributional 
Factor 
Effect 
 
(5) 
1964-2007 1.78 -0.27 1.30 -0.13 0.89 
1964-1982 0.77 -0.37 1.87 -1.05 0.33 
1982-2007 1.92 -0.79 0.89 0.53 1.29 
2007-2015 -0.03 -0.62 1.19 -0.86 0.26 
1982-2015 1.45 -0.75 0.96 0.19 1.04 
1964-2015 1.50 -0.33 1.28 -0.24 0.79 
 
We start off with the period 1964-2007 for the reason that it includes two long periods; the 
first, 1964-1982  recessionary period known as the ‘stagflation crisis’ and the second 1982-
2007 booming period known as ‘the new economy’ or ‘dot-com economy’. The underlying 
idea here is to examine to what extent, if any, these two long periods work in a way that their 
net effect leads to an overall falling rate of profit. We observe that the average annual growth 
rate of the VCC adjusted by capacity utilization is estimated at 1.78% whereas the growth rate 
of the technical change effect is 1.30% which is higher than the distribution effect of 0.89%. 
The price effect of -0.27% and the demand effect of 0.13% only play a minimal role.  
In examining each of these two successive periods, we observe that in the ‘stagflation’ 
crisis of 1964-1982 the growth rate of the value composition of capital plummets to 0.77%, a 
result attributed mainly to the technical change effect amounting to 1.87%, an all periods 
high. The effect of the distributional factor was positive but minimal amounting to the anemic 
0.33% which is another way to say that during a recessionary period real wages kept up with 
the growth of productivity holding down the growth of the rate of surplus value, as shown in 
Figure 2 below. The price effect was negative and equal to -0.37% reflecting the rather slow 
devaluation of the gross fixed capital stock. Also, as expected in a recessionary period, the 
demand effect was negative and its impact is estimated at -1.05%. 
By contrast, in the 1982-2007 period of the so-called ‘new economy’, we observe the 
maximal growth in the value composition of capital with an estimated annual growth rate at 
1.92% which is attributed, in large part, to the growth of the distributional factor which also 
reaches its maximal growth rate of 1.29% during this period. The growth of the technical 
change factor of 0.89% is the lowest of all examined periods while the demand factor, equal 
to 0.53%, was strong enough as expected in a growing economy. It is also of interest to note 
that the price effect was negative indicating the devaluation of capital attributed mainly to the 
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wide application of information technologies. Such results, at first sight, might lend partial 
support to the view that the rate of surplus value is responsible for the growth rate of the value 
composition of capital. On further examination, however, we conclude that the growth of the 
distributional factor is neither due to the influence of supervisory labour nor of the stagnant 
MCC but rather due to the application of neoliberal policies that, on the one hand, kept the 
real wages stagnant while  on the other hand the rapid technological transformation of the US 
economy led to the growth rate in productivity resulting in the unprecedented growth of the 
rate of surplus value rendering a distributional effect of 1.29% which contributed the most to 
the growth of the VCC.  
Similar to the ‘stagflation crisis’ are the results with respect to the breakdown of the 
growth of the value composition of capital during the ‘great recession’ included in the period 
2007-2015. In fact, the growth of the value composition is negative and equal to -0.03% and 
is attributed to the sizable negative relative price effect of -0.62% and also to the negative 
demand effect equal to -0.86%. The technical change effect was, once again, strong and equal 
to 1.19% while the positive and weak distributional effect could not but lead to the observed 
stagnant and rather negative growth rate in the value composition of capital.  
If, however, we extend the period under examination to include the years of the ‘great 
recession’; and in particular, if we examine the period 1982-2015, we observe that the 
economy returns to its normal motion. In particular, the distributional factor remains in its 
upward direction whereas the technical factor is trailing behind so that we observe an 
approximate equality on the effects of these two factors. In the same time period, the demand 
effect is minimal and equal to 0.19% and the devaluation of capital is rising well above the 
usual. 
The examination of the whole 1964-2015 period completes the picture in which what 
stands out is the rising value composition of capital at the annual growth rate of 1.50% which 
is attributed mainly to the technical change effect of 1.28% with the distributional factor 
contributing only by 0.79% while the effects of the other factors are by far smaller. 
The next step in our analysis is to examine the impact of these two key variables on the 
rate of profit. For this purpose we express the rate of profit 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑠𝑠/𝐶𝐶 in terms of the MCC, 
𝑄𝑄 = 𝐶𝐶/𝑙𝑙, and by putting limits to the variation of the rate of surplus value, 𝑒𝑒 = 𝑠𝑠/𝑣𝑣, 
according to the total labour time 𝑙𝑙, with 𝑙𝑙 = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣. Thus, we may write 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑠𝑠
𝑙𝑙
𝑙𝑙
𝐶𝐶
= 𝑠𝑠/𝑣𝑣1 + 𝑠𝑠/𝑣𝑣 1𝐶𝐶/𝑙𝑙 = 𝑒𝑒1 + 𝑒𝑒 1𝑄𝑄 
The expectation is that in the long-run both e and Q will be rising, but that the increase in e 
although it may be higher than that of 𝑄𝑄, will nevertheless have a progressively diminishing 
positive effect on the rate of profit since the potential increase of the term 𝑒𝑒 (1 + 𝑒𝑒)⁄  will be, 
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at most, equal to 1. While, on the other hand, Q, because of mechanization, increases without 
limits and therefore supersedes, in general, the increase in e. In effect, the rate of profit is 
highly inelastic with respect to (w.r.t.) e   
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒
𝑟𝑟
= 1(1 + 𝑒𝑒)2𝑄𝑄 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 1(1 + 𝑒𝑒)2𝑄𝑄 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(1 + 𝑒𝑒) 1𝑄𝑄 = 11 + 𝑒𝑒 
Clearly, the higher the rate of surplus value, other things being equal, the lower will its effect 
on the movement of the rate of profit be. In similar fashion, the elasticity of the rate of profit 
w.r.t Q will be 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄
𝑄𝑄
𝑟𝑟
= − 𝑒𝑒(1 + 𝑒𝑒)(1 + 𝑒𝑒)2𝑄𝑄2 𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒(1 + 𝑒𝑒) 1𝑄𝑄 = −1 
Thus we have a unitary elastic r w.r.t. Q, which means that if Q changes say by one percent, 
all else constant, the rate of profit will also change by one percent, but in the opposite 
direction.  
In Figure 2 below, we observe that the rate of surplus value in the US economy displays an 
overall rising trend. More specifically, the rate of surplus value over the period 1964-2015 is 
rising at an annual average growth rate of 1.07% and its overall average level is 285% while 
in the last fifteen years of our analysis the average is well above the 362%. It follows then that 
an increase in the capital-output ratio (or the MCC) by one percent requires a nearly fivefold 
increase in the rate of surplus value to maintain the rate of profit at the same level. This is 
equivalent to saying that the movement of the capital-output ratio is decisive in the actual 
movement of the rate of profit and that the effect of the rate of surplus-value, despite its 
strong actual rising trend progressively weakens with the passage of time. A corollary of this 
discussion is that the wage reductions or what is the same thing the economic policy effort to 
increase the rate of surplus value are not so effective in restoring profitability in the long-run 
as the devaluation of capital through innovations and in general technological change.  
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Figure 2. The rate of surplus value in the US economy 1964-2015 
 
As the capital-output ratio becomes ever more important in the movement of the rate of profit, 
we discover that the official estimates of this ratio become less and less reliable probably 
because of the build-in neoclassical conceptualization of the movement of this ratio. More 
specifically, in the neoclassical theory, the capital-output ratio is expected to be a mean-
reverting variable. If this ratio increases, it follows that capital is cheap (abundant) and labour 
is expensive (scarce); the extensive use of capital and the saving of labour will make capital 
more scarce than labour and the capital-output ratio will start its falling pattern. Thus, the 
neoclassical theory expects a mildly cyclical and an approximately constant capital-output 
ratio. The estimates of the capital stock by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) seem to 
bear this out to a certain extent. In fact, our estimates of the net capital-output ratio of the 
USA, based on data from the BEA for the year 1964, gave a net capital-output ratio of 2.70 
while for the year 2015 this ratio was somewhat higher at 3.03. Very similar are the estimates 
that one derives from the measurement of the capital-output ratio by the EU’s AMECO 
database (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm), where we 
observe, in most cases, trendless capital-output ratios. For example, in the AMECO database, 
it is assumed that all countries begin with the same real capital-output ratio which is equal to 
3 in 1960. However, only Greece and Spain, two ‘great recession’ ridden countries, display in 
2015 a real capital-output ratio substantially higher than its starting value, namely 4.35 and 
3.64, respectively. The majority of countries display a capital-output ratio near 3! The average 
of all EU (28) countries in 2015 is 3 and if one starts in 1997 the average is 2.9! Meanwhile, 
the data show the USA to display the same capital-output ratio with the other EU countries 
2
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with a value at 3 in 1960 while in 2015 this ratio plummeted to 2.35, a level that remains 
approximately constant since the year 2007.7 Clearly, there is something mysterious in the 
estimates of the real capital-output data, and we daresay that the measurement of this ratio is 
ideology-ridden. This is the reason that we opted for an alternative estimation of the capital-
output ratio based on the gross capital stock whose rationale and details of its construction are 
discussed in Appendix 2. 
The growth in the technical change factor during the examined 1964-1982 period as well 
as the ‘great recession’ of the post-2007 years together with the negative growth in the rate of 
capacity utilization and the fact that the prices of capital goods grow at a rate lower than that 
of the value-added deflator led to a relatively slow growth in the VCC and MCC. Such a 
result should not come as a surprise given the ‘stagflation crisis’ and the ‘great recession’ 
periods. The devaluation of capital was manifested in that the growth rates of the price index 
of capital goods were lagging behind those of the value-added deflator. 
 
3. The Rate of Profit, Unproductive Activities and the Crisis  
The concept of unproductive activity is fundamental for classical economists in general and 
Marx in particular. The idea is that the growth of unproductive activities implies that a portion 
of surplus value produced that would be available for investment is diverted to non-
production activities to the detriment of capital accumulation and economic growth (for 
example, Gillman, 1957, p. 85; Moseley, 1991, p. 153, Shaikh and Tonak, 1994, among 
others). Mohun (2014) takes issue with this analysis by arguing, from a class perspective 
point of view, that unproductive labour, on the one hand, did not increase to such an extent as 
to thwart profitability and, on the other hand, supervisory labour (classified as unproductive) 
instead of being detrimental to surplus production turned out to be surplus-generating labour. 
Furthermore, supervisory labour increased since the 1960s and may have important insights to 
offer on the rising inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth during the period of 
neoliberalism.  
Starting with the growth of unproductive labour Mohun (2014) is right that there has not 
been any spectacular increase in the ratio of unproductive labour so as in and of itself to 
threaten the stability of the system. However, Mohun limits his investigation to unproductive 
labour alone while the issue is broader for it refers to the growth of unproductive activities in 
general and not restricted to labour. Under these circumstances, it is worth stressing that in 
Marx (1857, p. 757 and 1968, p. 573) there are hints about unproductive activities which are 
thought to have an inherent tendency to expand. To what extent Marx’s conjecture is 
ascertained or not is, in our view, an empirical question that must wait for its resolution (or at 
                                                          
7 For further discussions on capital-output ratio of the US economy and its evolution since the 19the 
century see Mejorado and Roman (2014, ch. 7) 
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least have a more precise idea) until we have a longer span of data than at present. The 
underlying idea for the expansion of unproductive activities is that competition is intensified 
over time and thus larger and larger amounts of resources must be devoted to promotional 
efforts; furthermore, the growth of government expenditures (hence, one may also invoke the 
so-called Wagner’s law or other relevant Schumpeterian arguments about the bleak future of 
capitalism under the pressure of growing state activities) leads to an increase in taxation and 
thus the surplus available for investment is used for the maintenance of social order and not 
necessarily in investment in production activities. Surprisingly enough, this idea may also be 
found in the neoclassical approach and more particularly in the hypothesis of the cost disease 
of (public) services (Baumol, 1967, inter alia) or the rent-seeking activities. According to 
Baumol, the increasing burden of services has mainly to do with the idea that the productivity 
of the service sectors is not only very hard to pinpoint but even when the various obstacles to 
its measurement are superseded, it is found that the labour productivity in services lags behind 
the economy’s average productivity. Meanwhile, the tendency for uniform wage rates across 
sectors makes the cost of services progressively higher slowing down the economy’s growth 
potential. Until very recently, at least, the idea that services are labour intensive activities and 
that it is a much more difficult enterprise to apply further division of labour and 
mechanization to services and by the extent to many non-production activities was 
widespread. In other words, technological change is not easily applicable to service activities 
which remain persistently labour intensive. It seems that during the neoliberal period of the 
‘new economy’, the situation with respect to labour in services has changed radically, and 
even the hard to mechanize non-production activities became amenable to mechanization and 
thus both the number of people engaged in such activities as well as the cost of provision of 
these activities relative to the invested capital were reduced.  
Figure 3 below may be used to explain these developments and lend partial support to 
Mohun’s (2014) findings of the slowdown in the growth of unproductive activities. In effect, 
the share of non-production labour, shown on the right-hand side (r.h.s.) axis of Figure 3, was 
rising up until about the year 1990 and then became pretty much trendless indicating that the 
computerization, that is, the modern form of hyper-mechanization, reduced somewhat the 
share of the non-production labour to total employment. Nevertheless, if we take the whole 
1964-2015 period into account there is a slightly rising slope, however, not very different 
from zero. While this is true in terms of employment, we cannot say the same thing in terms 
of the wages of non-production labourers, measured on the l.h.s. of Figure 3 whose share kept 
rising up until the years of the ‘great recession’ and then stabilized at a level much higher than 
that of the start year. These developments show that during the neoliberal period there has 
been a redistribution of income in favour of the non-production workers and since their 
number did not keep rising, we can reasonably speculate that, in this case, it was not the rise 
13 
 
of the average wage but rather the super-high salaries (plus commissions and bonuses) of the 
corporate officers (the so-called CEOs) for their supervisory and managerial functions that 
accounted for the observed inequalities. By no means has this implied that the managerial or 
supervisory labour contributed, in any way, to the creation of surplus value; this type of 
labour activity merely contributed to the redistribution of surplus value among its claimants. 
Mohun (2014) is right in that this labour activity might be responsible, at least in part, for the 
rising income and wealth disparities identified in a number of recent studies. It is interesting 
to note that the ratio of unproductive expenditures to surplus value, shown on the r.h.s. axis of 
Figure 3, is increasing on average up until the year 2000 and then starts to fall, a fall that 
gives rise to a slightly rising ratio over the examined 1964-2015 period. We speculate that the 
fall of this ratio after about the year 2000 is due, in large part, to the burst of the real estate 
and the stock markets bubbles. The innovations that followed targeted more the service sector 
and in general the unproductive activities undercutting their cost of operation.  
 
 
Figure 3. Shares of non-production expenditures, wages and labour, 1964-2015 
 
A rising general rate of profit is fully consistent with rising unproductive expenditures even 
when their increase is so large that depresses the net rate of profit. The idea is that the rising 
general rate of profit shows that the system is basically healthy and capable of sustaining the 
increasing burden of unproductive activities. The situation changes when the general rate of 
profit is falling which may depress the net rate of profit even further in its downward 
direction. If the unproductive expenditures and activities are rising then they apply additional 
pressure on the economy-wide net rate of profit compressing it furthermore down thereby 
worsening the situation by leading the economy sooner rather than later to the tipping point of 
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a phase change. Thus, the general rate of profit, R, is equal to the net rate of profit, r, plus the 
ratio of unproductive expenditures, 𝑢𝑢, to capital stock 𝐶𝐶. Thus, we may write, 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶
+ 𝑢𝑢
𝐶𝐶
 and 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑅𝑅 − 𝑢𝑢
𝐶𝐶
 
Where 𝑠𝑠 is the net profits measured by subtracting from the current GDP the sum of  
depreciation, the wages of employees of the private and government enterprises, the imputed 
wages of the self-employed population, the taxes on production and imports less subsidies 
plus business current transfer payments minus the imputations of the operating surplus. The 
remaining part of surplus value, that is the unproductive expenditures 𝑢𝑢, includes the sum of 
wages, materials and depreciation of the unproductive sectors of the economy, namely, the 
retail and wholesale trade as well as the finance and real estate sectors (see Table A1 for the 
North American Industry Classification System, NAICS, nomenclature of these unproductive 
activities) augmented by the indirect business taxes. Figure 4 below displays the evolution of 
the net rate of profit, 𝑟𝑟, along with the unproductive expenditures both estimated with the use 
of the gross capital stock in the US economy adjusted by capacity utilization. During, the 
entire period of our analysis both variables display very similar fluctuations and therefore 
similar trends. 
 
 
Figure 4. Unproductive expenditures and the net rate of profit 
 
We observe that near the tipping points (of the late-1960s and late-1990s) the unproductive 
expenditures weighted by the capital stock remain at a high level and with the onset of the 
falling rate of profit follow in the downward direction, as we very well know from 
downsizing and restructuring of the business organization after the early 1980s. The 
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subsequent growth of the U.S. economy was accompanied by its necessary complement, that 
is, the growth of unproductive expenditures. The rising (general and net) rate of profit is 
accompanied by the rising unproductive expenditures until the attainment of another tipping 
point around 1997, where once again the unproductive expenditures will take another dip. A 
closer look at Figure 3 reveals that the falling pattern of the rate of profit in the post-1982 
years seems to have begun in the year 1997, however as it has been repeatedly stated a falling 
rate of profit in and of itself does not lead to a crisis and may be fully consistent with a 
growing economy.8 Only if the rate of profit falls persistently then a point is reached where 
the mass of real net profits becomes stagnant. In Figure 4 we also display the logarithm (for 
expositional purposes) of the real net profits measured on the r.h.s. axis. We observe that the 
real net profits stagnate in the late 1960s and that this stagnation lasts up until the early 1980s; 
we have a repetition of this pattern in the mid to late-2000s with net profits stagnating, once 
again, punctuating the period of the ‘great recession’. Under these circumstances, that is, 
stagnating mass of real net profits, businesses on average are reluctant to invest, either 
because the profits that they make are not enough or because the expectations for future 
profits are bleak and also potential lenders are particularly reluctant to finance investment 
projects. As a consequence, massive bankruptcies follow and unemployment rates are on the 
rise. This is the period of time when we also expect and in fact, unproductive expenditure to 
fall consequent upon the path of the net rate of profit.  
Our findings (see Figure 3) have shown that in the long-run, unproductive expenditures 
constitute a rising portion of total surplus value in the economy, however, this is an empirical 
and, we think, a very long-run issue. With the available span and quality of data, we can only 
say that the growth of unproductive expenditures is limited by the evolution of the general 
rate of profit. A falling general rate of profit sooner or later entails a fall in the net rate of 
profit and also the rate of unproductive expenditures weighted by capital stock. Consequently, 
both the average rate of profit and the rate of unproductive expenditures move together 
towards a downward direction and we may hypothesize that the movement of the average rate 
of profit shapes the movement of the unproductive expenditures. The rationale is as follows: 
A rising average rate of profit offers the fuel for the expansion of the nonproduction activities; 
the idea is that the rising rate of profit means more investment activity, higher production and 
higher need for the promotional efforts entailing the growth of retail and wholesale trade, the 
finance and real estate activities which may follow suit. The build-up of fixed capital stock, 
sooner or later, leads to a falling rate of profit which discourages investment and so slows 
down the demand for new loans, that is the demand for the output of financial institutions. 
The latter, in order to avoid losses from the defaults of their borrowers, are bound to lower 
                                                          
8 “A fall in the rate of profit and accelerated accumulation are different expressions of the same process 
only in so far as both reflect the development of productiveness” (Marx, Capital III, p.241). 
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their interest rates in order to supply the needed liquidity and stimulate in any way possible 
the investment activity. However, the lower interest rates induce the financial institutions to 
expand (in the beginning and up to a point, at least) their lending activity in order to acquire 
the same revenues as before the fall in the rate of interest which makes them to lend out 
money without much consideration about the fundamentals of the borrowers and at the same 
time their own limitations. This is the reason that from the 1980s onwards financial 
institutions are pressing governments for more deregulation of what banks consider to be a 
growth-stifling financial environment. The result is the creation of a number of bubbles which 
when they burst lead to a fall in the size of the unproductive activities and, at the same time, 
to lower profit rates.9  
  
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The US and the world economy since the year 2007 entered a new phase that bears startling 
similarities with that of the late-1960s. The evolution of the profit rate and the mass of real 
profits identify the year 2007 as the tipping point, that is, the year when profits stagnate and 
start their falling course. The falling net rate of profit is responsible for this new phase 
change, the ‘great recession’, and this fall in the net rate of profit is attributed mainly to the 
rising value composition of capital, further exacerbated by the rise in unproductive activities 
and the associated with these expenditures which reached a plateau somewhat earlier than 
2007.  
The empirical evidence corroborates the idea that the ‘great recession’ of the late-2000s 
shares the same salient features with the ‘stagflation crisis’ of the 1970s while of course there 
are important differences which have mainly to do with the fact that in current times the 
welfare state that converted back to the 1970s a major crisis into “a silent one”, that is one 
with low unemployment, is no longer in place. Furthermore, the new technologies associated 
with computerization and automation seem to have expanded the scale of their application by 
including the service industries and the unproductive activities in general. As a consequence, 
employment in these industries diminished and the share of employment in unproductive 
activities in the total employment remained constant or slightly falling.  However, we showed 
that this is not true for the share of unproductive wages which kept rising, lending support to 
the idea that the managerial and supervisory labour in these activities has been rewarded by 
much higher salaries which explain, at least in part, the increasing income and wealth 
disparities. The fall in the rate of profit led to the stagnant mass of net profits around the late-
                                                          
9 Preliminary econometric analysis utilizing both the Yamamoto and the ARDL cointegration tests of 
the three variables, namely, the rate of profit, the unproductive activities and the long-term interest rate 
showed unidirectional causality from the rate of profit to the interest rate and the unproductive 
activities. 
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2000s that reduced the net investment up until the recent years. For example, net investment 
of the private sector as a percentage of GDP during the ‘great recession’ of 2007-2015 was on 
an average equal to 2.01% as opposed to the 1964-2015 period when it was on average equal 
to 4.08% while the period of the ‘new economy’ the share of net investment in GDP was 
3.70% which is lower than the average of the whole period suggesting a downward long-run 
trend in this ratio.10  
The evolution of the mass of real net profits does not seem to have run its full trajectory 
thereby justifying all those that characterized it as the ‘great recession’. It seems that Marx’s 
thesis (1857 [1973], p. 750) about major crises which is that “[…] these regularly recurring 
catastrophes lead to their repetition on a higher scale, and finally to its violent overthrow” we 
cannot predict that will be fulfilled. All we can say is that the capitalist system will be quite 
different in the years to come, as major institutional changes are already under way and the 
sign of their direction (in favour of capital or labour) will depend on the way in which the 
political element will exert its pressure. 
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Appendix 1: Data and their Source 
The classification of economic activities into productive and unproductive is an absolutely 
necessary requirement for the meaningful estimation of the classical and Marxian categories 
of surplus value and variable capital. In a previous effort (Paitaridis and Tsoulfidis 2012) we 
based our estimations on the past classification system; namely SIC (1987). However, the 
revision of the US Industrial classification system from SIC into NAICS (1997) has 
necessitated the reconsideration of the productive and unproductive activities in a manner that 
suits better to the new classification system as is displayed in table A. 
 
 
Table A1. Classification of Sectors 
Productive Activities Unproductive Activities 
Farms 
   
   
  T
ra
de
 
Wholesale trade 
Forestry, fishing, and related activities Retail trade 
Mining Real estate  
Utilities Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible assets 
Construction 
R
oy
al
tie
s 
Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, 
and related activities 
Manufacturing Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 
Transportation and warehousing Insurance carriers and related activities 
Information Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 
Computer systems design and related services Legal services 
Educational services Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services 
Health care and social assistance Management of companies and enterprises 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation Administrative and support services 
Accommodation and food services Waste management and remediation services 
Other services, except government Federal general government (defense) 
Government enterprises (Federal) Federal general government (nondefense) 
Government enterprises (State and Local) State and local general government 
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The revision of the accounting system attempts to reflect the changing structure of the US 
economy of the recent decades with the emergence of the new (mainly information based) 
technology and the expansion of the service sector activities. This revision resulted in the 
availability of more detailed data especially for the service sector; that made possible the 
more consistent with the theory (of productive non-productive labour) classification of 
industries than those in the previous system. Furthermore, the new classification system 
renders possible the inclusion of a number of service industries with increasing importance, in 
the productive activities of the economy. For example, the trade sector (Wholesale Trade and 
Retail Trade, SIC codes 50-51 and 52-59) is viewed in principle as unproductive; 
nevertheless, there are particular activities, especially those that are near the completion of the 
product such as cutting and packaging which take place within the trade sector that are 
productive. At the same time, there are industries such as Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 
code 58) which would be classified as productive and in the former system were subsumed in 
the trade sector with no further information to reclassify them. The NAICS treats the Eating 
and Drinking Places as a separate industry and so we can place it in the productive sectors of 
the economy without the need to adopt any heroic assumptions for its reclassification as in the 
former system. This is also the case with the New Technology industries such as the Data 
Processing, Internet Publishing, and Other Information Services (NAICS codes 518, 519) and 
the Computer Systems Design and Related Services (NAICS code 5415). In the former 
classification system, these productive activities were included in the Computer Data and 
Processing Services (SIC code 7370) which in turn was part of the non-productive Business 
Services (SIC code 7300) again with no clue as to how to classify it properly. 
Despite the above improvement of the US classification system, the estimation of long-
term Marxian categories is not easy to carry out. The reason is that the US statistical agencies 
such as the BEA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) have not fully updated the 
industrial data for the US postwar economy according to the NAICS system. In particular, 
although the BEA has made significant progress in updating the GDP by Industry and the 
Input-Output Accounts nevertheless there has not yet been equal progress in the case of 
employment and wage data, whose update is limited to the period from 1998 onwards. The 
same holds true with the BLS where in many industries the updated data do not fully cover 
the postwar period or at least the period from the early 1960s onwards. The treatment of this 
inconsistency in the data was overridden in two steps. Firstly, we attempted an abridgment 
between the industries that are classified according to the SIC and the NAICS following the 
guidelines of the US Census Bureau (2000). Secondly, we estimated the NAICS missing 
data11 by extrapolating backward through the following formula: 
 
Zt-1NAICS=1+�
∑ Yj,t-1SIC -∑ Yj,tSICnj=1nj=1
∑ Yj,tsicnj=1
� ∙XtNAICS 
 
Where Χ is the last available data of NAICS industry at time t, 𝛶𝛶 is the SIC proxy industry to 
𝛸𝛸,𝑍𝑍 is the resulting estimated data of NAICS industry. Finally, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑛𝑛 stands for the 
various SIC industries. Comparing our new NAICS-based estimations on Marxian categories 
                                                          
11 For some industries there were no available data with the SIC system. In that case, we relied upon 
Mohun’s methodology (2005). 
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with our past SIC-based estimations we find relatively small deviations12 thereby lending 
support to our proposed estimating method. 
Having accomplished the integration of the time series, we are able to proceed with the 
estimation of the Marxian categories starting with the Marxian value added (MVA). In 
national account terms, the MVA is defined as the sum of the net (of depreciation) value 
added of productive sectors of the economy plus the royalties (taxes, rents, interests) paid by 
the productive sectors to the royalty sectors of the economy (financial institutions, 
unproductive services and government) plus the gross output of trade, real estate and rental 
and leasing sectors net of imputations.13  
In economic terms, the MVA is the total value produced by the productive workers and 
consists of two parts, the surplus value and the variable capital. Thus, subtracting the variable 
capital, that is, the wages of the productive workers we can estimate the surplus value. For the 
estimation of variable capital we need two variables, the number of productive employees (𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝) and their respective nominal wage. We assess the number of productive employees 
starting with the total number of workers (𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗)NIPA employed in the production sectors (𝑗𝑗 =  1,2, . . . ,𝑛𝑛) according to NIPA tables. In this total are included both employed and self-
employed. In order to identify the number of the unproductive employees (and the so-called 
corporate officers) of the productive sectors, we use data from the BLS, and for each 
productive industry 𝑗𝑗 we take the share of productive to the total number of employees, that is (𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝/𝐿𝐿)𝑗𝑗. Consequently, the number of productive workers in sector j is estimated as follows 
 (𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝)𝑗𝑗 = (𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝/𝐿𝐿)𝑗𝑗 ∙ (𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗)NIPA  
The estimation of variable capital should also include the employer’s social security 
contributions because this is a labor cost for businesses. For this purpose, we estimate the 
ratio of the compensation of productive workers (EC) to the wages and salaries (WS) for each 
sector. The ratio between those two variables gives us a markup with the aid of which, we can 
estimate the social security contributions: 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = (𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶/𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊)𝑗𝑗  
Subsequently, we multiply the average weekly wage of productive workers (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗) in each 
productive sector by xj in order to estimate in the wage data of the BLS the social security 
contributions. The so-estimated average wage is multiplied by 52 weeks to get the average 
annual wage, which multiplied by the total number of productive workers in each sector gives 
the variable capital in each productive sector of the economy: 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 = (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗) ∙ (𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝)𝑗𝑗 
 
Finally, the total variable capital is estimated by summing the variable capitals across 
industries. 
 
                                                          
12 For instance, for the period 1964-2007 the Mean Absolute Deviation between the different 
estimations on Marxian value added is 1.72% and on Surplus Value is 2.04%. 
13 In the imputations, we include the owner-occupied housing output, the farm tenant-occupied housing 
owned by farm operator landlords, the farms owned by non-operator landlords and the various royalties 
(i.e., patents, license fees etc.) 
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Appendix 2: Estimation of the total gross fixed capital stock  
The capital stock is the accumulation of the past investment flows. Easy as this definition may 
be, its application to actual data is fraught with many difficulties associated with depreciation 
and replacement investment. In the USA the BEA publishes annual estimates of the capital 
stock based on the assumption of a given geometric growth rate of depreciation where the 
lifetime of investment goods is infinite. This was not true in the pre-1993 estimates of capital 
stock where the assumption was that the lifetime of fixed capital investment was finite and for 
this reason Shaikh (2016) in his estimations of capital stock for the US corporate sector 
employs the assumption of the finite life of capital goods utilizing a depletion rate for the 
gross capital stock as well as a depreciation rate for the net capital stock. Furthermore, both 
the old and the new BEA definitions of capital stock do not take into account the impact of 
the great depression of the 1930s and the effects of WWII. For this reason Shaikh (2016) in 
his estimations constructs an  adjustment ratio utilizing the accounting values of fixed capital 
stock of the US corporate sector and applying this ratio to estimate the fixed capital of the 
ΒΕΑ (1993) for the period 1925-1947 while for the period 1948-2011 he utilizes the Gross 
Perpetual Inventory Model (GΡΙΜ). 
 
It is important to note that our estimations refer to the total private non-residential fixed 
assets and government enterprises of the US economy and not only its corporate sector. We 
refer to the total capital stock in order our estimates to be more general since productive or 
non-productive activities and employment are not restricted to the corporate sector. More 
specifically, starting from the year 1925 we estimate following Malikane (2017), the initial 
capital stock and for the remaining years we apply Shaikh's GPIM methodology. The formula 
for the estimation of the current value gross capital stock (GC) is as follows 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + (1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡)�1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘�𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 
 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 the gross investment in current prices, 𝛿𝛿 the rate of depreciation (𝛿𝛿 = 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ), 
𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾 the net capital stock and  𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  the growth rate in prices. For the estimation of 𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 we need 
a starting value for the capital stock, that is, 𝐺𝐺𝐾𝐾0 for which we apply the following formula 
𝐺𝐺𝐾𝐾0 = 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺1(1 + 𝑔𝑔𝛪𝛪) − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 + ?́?𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) 
 
where (1 + 𝑔𝑔𝛪𝛪) is the average growth rate of the gross investment in the period under 
examination. In particular, for the estimation of 𝑔𝑔𝛪𝛪 we determine initially the natural 
logarithm of the investment and subsequently we regress it against time and a constant. The 
advantage of this approach is that the information contained in the used investment series is 
making the result less sensitive to the initial period conditions (Nehru and Dhareshwar, 1993). 
The coefficient of the time trend is the 𝑔𝑔𝛪𝛪 the parameter 𝛿𝛿 represents the average depreciation 
while ?́?𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  is the average growth rate of prices during the examined period. It is important to 
note that the estimation of gross capital stock is based on the gross investment and that during 
the 1970s there has been a slowdown in the growth of investment 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 which is also reflected 
on the stagnating or falling growth rate of 𝐺𝐺𝐾𝐾 while the rate of surplus value was growing at 
record high rates during the same time period.  
